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Abstract
The official negotiation process to resolve the conflict in eastern Ukraine, the “Minsk Process”,
has been ongoing since 2014, with very little tangible success. Based on interviews conducted
with persons living in different regions of Ukraine and Russia, this paper examines positions
on the Minsk Process held by those most immediately affected by the crisis. Focusing on the
restoration of Ukrainian statehood in the non-government-controlled areas of the Donetsk and
Luhansk regions as a key issue in the conflict, the paper identifies two main positions: “border
first” and “status first”. Exploring the needs and fears that underlie these positions enables us to
identify shared interests and creates space for the development of mutually acceptable solutions.
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Introduction1
For the past six years, the official process
to settle the conflict in the Donbas area
of eastern Ukraine, known as the “Minsk
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Process”, has aimed to implement the
provisions of the so-called “Minsk agree-
ments” designed to restore peace and se-
curity in eastern Ukraine. This goal has
remained elusive. At the core of the prob-
lem is the fact that diverging positions on
key provisions of the agreements, for ex-
ample on restoring Ukrainian statehood
in eastern Ukraine, are held not only by
officials at the Minsk talks but also at the
societal level, in all areas affected by the
conflict.
This paper aims to identify these di-
verse societal positions and to explore the
interests, needs, and fears that underlie
them. In our analysis, we do not take a
stand on who is responsible for the war
or which political positions are most con-
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ducive to ending it. Rather, we see our
role as that of discussing how the official
peace process and its key provisions are
perceived by members of society on all
sides, and searching for common inter-
ests that could contribute to unblocking
the road to sustainable peace.
The paper is based on the study “The
Minsk Process as Perceived from With-
in”, which was conceptualized and con-
ducted by Ukrainian, Russian, and Swiss
researchers2 from 2017 to 2020 within
the framework of the transnational dia-
logue platform Women’s Initiatives for
Peace in Donbas (WIPD).3 The study ex-
amined perceptions of the Minsk process
in different regions of Ukraine, includ-
ing the non-government-controlled areas
(NGCAs) of the Donetsk and Luhansk
regions, and in Russia.4 Following the
WIPD’s approach of combining dialogue
and practical cooperation, sometimes re-
ferred to as “diapraxis”,5 the study was
conducted as a research dialogue, in
which results were elaborated in constant
exchange among researchers representing
different sides to the conflict.
The initial aim of the study was to in-
troduce positions on the Minsk Process
held by members of society into the offi-
cial negotiations, based on the premise
that their exclusion might lead to blind
spots in a future agreement, thus creat-
ing problems for its implementation. Our
preliminary findings challenged this as-
sumption. They showed that societal per-
ceptions of the key provisions of the
Minsk agreements, although excluded
from the official discourse, by and large
reflect the diverging positions that have
led to stalemates in the negotiations. This
insight inspired us to reorient our study:
we sought rather to analyse the interests
that underlie these societal perceptions
with a view to discovering areas where
they converge. Such an analysis creates
space for the generation of options poten-
tially acceptable to all, which can be use-
ful not only for the official peace process
but also for multitrack peacemaking ini-
tiatives.
In this paper, we focus on one of
the key points of contention in the
Minsk Process, which also emerged as
one of the most controversial questions
among those interviewed in our study:
the restoration of Ukrainian statehood
in eastern Ukraine. We identified two
main narratives in this regard, which we
dubbed “border first” and “status first”
narratives. The exploration of the inter-
ests underlying these opposing narratives
revealed a number of needs and fears
shared by the respondents representing
the different sides. The most prominent,
especially among respondents from areas
in the immediate vicinity of the conflict,
were de-militarization and physical secu-
rity, socio-economic survival and mobil-
ity, and political participation. Our ana-
lysis shows that between the moderate
positions within the two main narratives
there is potential space for exploring mu-
tually acceptable solutions.
Methodology
Our study examined the positions and
interests of those interviewed through a
conceptual lens inspired by the Harvard
method of interest-based negotiations. A
Cécile Druey, Anna Hess, Julia Kaplan, Valentina Cherevatenko
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key principle of the Harvard method is
that parties to a conflict and their pos-
itions are separate from the interests that
underlie them. Accordingly, understand-
ing parties’ interests, needs, and fears in-
creases the chances of generating options
that are conducive to a mutually accept-
able solution.6
Data was collected from 144 qualita-
tive interviews conducted between 2018
and 2019, covering all geographic regions
impacted by the conflict in Donbas.
These include the government-controlled
areas (GCAs) of Ukraine (in the central,
western, eastern, and southern parts of
the country), the NGCAs (in the Luhansk
and Donetsk regions), and Russia (the
border region with Ukraine and the cen-
tral/northern parts of Russia). In addi-
tion, interviews were conducted with per-
sons in two non-geographic categories:
internally displaced persons from Don-
bas in Ukraine and Donbas refugees in
Russia. The latter group proved to be
a valuable source, as the positions held
by Donbas refugees in Russia often re-
flect the opinions of NGCA inhabitants
more openly. The study did not aim to
collect quantitative information or to re-
construct proportions. Rather, it focused
on analysing narratives. These narratives
were deduced from thematically coded
interviews and then compared among
groups of respondents, which were la-
belled with geographic and demographic
codes. The study was not focused on any
particular social group and was based on
voluntary participation. Perhaps as a re-
sult of this selection based on motivation,
around two thirds of the respondents had
a higher education, most of them were
between 35 and 55 years old, and women
were slightly overrepresented compared
to men (57 per cent).
Background
Since its inception in 2014, the conflict
in eastern Ukraine has claimed over
13,000 lives.7 Ukraine is now home
to around 1.5 million internally dis-
placed persons,8 and at least one million
refugees have left Donbas for Russia.9
As a result of the high-intensity conflict,
Ukraine has lost control over its state
border with Russia and parts of Donbas,
the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhan-
sk People’s Republics.10 A 472-kilometre
contact line divides the region into GCAs
and NGCAs.11 The conflict has not on-
ly eroded Ukraine’s state sovereignty but
also caused major infrastructural damage,
resulting in a crumbling economy and an
affected population living in dire human-
itarian conditions. The security situation
along the contact line remains volatile.
The fault lines do not adhere to geo-
graphical and ideological boundaries, in-
stead running straight through the heart
of societies, with family members and
friends often finding themselves in differ-
ent camps.
International efforts to deal with the
conflict in eastern Ukraine were launched
in 2014, but the violence did not begin
to abate until the end of 2016/early 2017.
What is commonly referred to as the
“Minsk agreements” are three documents
from September 2014 (the Minsk Proto-
col and the Minsk Memorandum) and
February 2015 (the Package of Measures
The Minsk Process: Societal Perceptions and Narratives
3
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748922339-08, am 31.03.2021, 08:38:22
Open Access -  - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
on the Implementation of the Minsk
Agreements), signed by Russia, Ukraine,
and representatives of the NGCAs, under
the auspices of the four heads of state or
government of the “Normandy Format”
(Germany, France, Russia, and Ukraine).
The agreements serve as the basis for
talks within the OSCE Trilateral Contact
Group (TCG) and its four thematic work-
ing groups.12 The Minsk Process and no-
tably the TCG is the only format that
brings together all parties to the conflict
at the official level. Six years after the
signing of the agreements and biweekly
meetings in Minsk, however, there is no
comprehensive and sustainable ceasefire
and no political solution in place. One
of the key obstacles to the implementa-
tion of the Minsk agreements remains the
issue of sequencing their political and se-
curity provisions. Other factors that have
hampered implementation include proce-
dural non-transparency and the contested
political and military role of Russia.
Restoring Ukrainian statehood: From
diverging positions to converging
interests?
As mentioned above, restoring Ukrainian
statehood in eastern Ukraine is a main
point of contention in the Minsk Process.
While the Ukrainian government insists
on restoring control over its border with
Russia before any decisions can be made
about the status of the NGCAs, the latter,
backed by Russia, demand autonomy and
security guarantees before a possible rein-
tegration of the territories into Ukrainian
territory can be discussed. At face value,
the diverging narratives identified in our
study, ranging from a “border first” to
a “status first” approach, reflect the offi-
cial positions that have led to the current
stalemate. However, our analysis shows
that the respondents’ attitudes reflect a
broad spectrum of positions. Between
the extremes of “hard reintegration” and
“full independence”, they also hold more
moderate attitudes that can be engaged
with to generate mutually acceptable out-
comes.
This spectrum of narratives is present-
ed in the following subsections, followed
by a summary of the relevant needs and
fears that underlie them and the reactions
they have provoked. Table 1 provides an
overview.
Cécile Druey, Anna Hess, Julia Kaplan, Valentina Cherevatenko
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Table 1: Overview of narratives and positions
Narrative Position Underlying fears/inter-
ests






required in the first
instance
Position 1
“Hard reintegration and restora-











• Russia (central part)
Position 2
“Territorial integrity and nation-
al interest”
Fear:
• special status of the




• Ukraine (all parts)
• Russia (all parts)
Position 3





• restoration of state-
hood and infrastruc-
ture in the conflict re-
gion
• Ukraine, areas close
to the conflict zone
(GCAs and NGCAs)







the NGCAs is re-







• “hard integration” as
a humanitarian disas-
ter for NGCA inhabi-
tants
Interest:
• human security of
NGCAs
• NGCAs
• Donbas refugees in
Russia
Position 5
“Transitional autonomy and soft
independence”
Interests:
• human security of
NGCAs
• restoration of state-
hood and infrastruc-
ture in the conflict re-
gion
• Ukraine GCAs (all
parts)
• NGCAs
• Russia (border re-
gion)
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Narrative I: Reintegration and the
“border first” perspective
The tension between the two main narra-
tives, namely the “border first” and “sta-
tus first” narratives, mirrors the challenge
of sequencing the security and the politi-
cal provisions of the Minsk agreements.
“Border first” respondents believe that
Ukraine must first restore its control over
the border with Russia if there are to be
further steps toward resolution.
Position 1: “Hard re-integration and
restoration of the status quo ante”
“I am not in favour of any spe-
cial status for those regions [for the
NGCAs], apart from the fact that
these regions must be subject to strict
discipline, surveillance, and order. In
short, I want and believe it is fair
and right for these regions to be pun-
ished.” (Central Ukraine)
Among the more radical positions with-
in the “border first” narrative is the call
for the “hard re-integration” of the NG-
CAs into Ukrainian territory, often cou-
pled with a call for the restoration of the
territorial status quo ante (including for
Crimea). In military terms, these respon-
dents view this “hard reintegration” as
involving the restoration of full control
over (and the total closure of) the bor-
der with Russia and a military takeover
of the Donbas. In socio-cultural terms,
this would mean the restoration of full
control over and a “(re‑)Ukrainization”
of the population in the NGCAs, often
also reflecting a note of retribution (see
quote above). The option of granting
autonomy to the NGCAs based on the
special status law, as discussed in the
Minsk agreements, is categorically reject-
ed by these respondents, who fear that
“special status” would be used by Rus-
sia to exert pressure on Kyiv’s security
and foreign policymaking through the
political participation of Donbas author-
ities in Ukrainian politics.13 In general,
proponents of this position consider Rus-
sian aggression the main, if not the on-
ly, cause of the conflict in Donbas, view-
ing the popular motto “Russia out!” as a
promise of salvation and the de-Russifica-
tion of the Donbas as essential to peace.
Interestingly, this “hard reintegration”,
“Russia out!” position was expressed by
respondents not only in southern and
central Ukraine but also in Russia, most
often in regions most remote from the
zone of immediate conflict.
With its preference for a military solu-
tion and its ideological and highly emo-
tional quality, the “hard reintegration”
position stands in opposition especially
with that of inhabitants of the NGCAs
and Donbas refugees in Russia. It also di-
verges from the opinions held by respon-
dents living close to the conflict zone in
the government-controlled parts of Don-
bas and southern Russia, who argue that
a military re-seizure of the Donbas would
threaten the security and the economic
development of the entire region.
This radical position would seem to be
partly due to a lack of accurate informa-
tion on the content and procedures of
the Minsk Process. Several respondents
from the GCAs, the NGCAs, the Donbas
Cécile Druey, Anna Hess, Julia Kaplan, Valentina Cherevatenko
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refugee population, and Russia have in-
dicated that they have little to no infor-
mation on the peace process and that
when they do get information, it is usual-
ly through informal channels, their trust-
ed sources being bloggers and other influ-
ential elites. As a result, concepts such
as “special status”, “federalism”, “autono-
my”, and “amnesty” are associated with
myths of territorial loss and creeping Rus-
sification. A lack of transparency and
reliable information on the conceptual
and operational modalities of these key
concepts has led to the spread of fear and
the hardening of positions.
Position 2: “Territorial integrity and the
national interest”
“[restoring peace means] the achieve-
ment of complete control of Ukraine
over the entire state border of
Ukraine. I consider this to be abso-
lutely necessary; each country has
the right to sovereignty!” (Central
Ukraine)
This position adheres to the “border first”
narrative, but views the issue of reinte-
gration from a legal and institutional,
rather than an ideological, point of view.
Proponents of this position believe that
the NGCAs should be reincorporated and
that border control should be restored
due to the Ukrainian state’s right (and
obligation) to exercise jurisdiction over
its entire internationally recognized terri-
tory.
This position differs from the “hard
reintegration” approach not only due
to its more sober content but also be-
cause it provokes less opposition. There
is broad consensus among respondents
from all groups, including inhabitants of
the NGCAs and the even more radical
refugees in southern Russia, that territor-
ial integrity and an intact border regime
with Russia are in principle positive be-
cause they are core conditions of a well-
functioning Ukrainian statehood.
When we unpack the “territorial in-
tegrity and national interest” position
and the more radical “hard reintegration”
and “Russia out!” approach, it becomes
clear that the main interest underlying
both positions is the need for Ukraini-
an sovereignty and fear of Ukraine’s fur-
ther territorial fragmentation. The fear of
fragmenting Ukrainian state power goes
hand in hand with indignation regarding
Russia’s dominance. The call for a full
Russian withdrawal and the reluctance
to agree on local elections and on giv-
ing the NGCAs special status are also
fuelled by fear of the increasing Russifi-
cation of eastern Ukraine. Further, sev-
eral respondents from southern Russia
and Ukrainian-controlled Donbas have
expressed their apprehension regarding
the geo-politicization of the conflict, in
particular Moscow’s use of the Donbas
and notably the permeability of its border
with Russia as an instrument for freezing
and thawing the conflict, depending on
Kyiv’s stance towards Moscow.
The Minsk Process: Societal Perceptions and Narratives
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Position 3: “Soft reintegration and the
restoration of statehood”
“[Ukrainian control of the state bor-
der means] the entry/exit control of
normal citizens and visitors of the
country. The same applies to the
movement of goods. But they [i.e.
the Minsk Protocols] do not men-
tion this, they only mention that no
supplies for the armed formations
should be allowed to pass through...”
(eastern Ukraine/Donbas GCAs)
Among the more moderate stances with-
in the “border first” narrative is the “soft
reintegration” position. In contrast to the
more hard-line positions discussed above,
it emphasizes not the control or closure
of the border, but the restoration of bor-
ders that fulfil their normal functions, as
part of the restoration and consolidation
of Ukrainian statehood in the zones im-
mediately affected by the conflict.
This stance accords with Johan Gal-
tung’s notion of “positive peace” as in-
volving stability beyond a purely mili-
tary sense, where not only the immi-
nent problems of (physical) security but
also the root causes of conflict are ad-
dressed.14 In particular, respondents from
areas close to the conflict on the Ukraini-
an-controlled side and in southern Rus-
sia emphasized the importance of a “pos-
itive” state presence as a basis for success-
ful reintegration in the future. In their
eyes, this entails reinstatement of an in-
tact legal system, a functioning socio-eco-
nomic infrastructure, and the presence of
administrative structures across Ukraine,
including the NGCAs. On this view,
restoration of Ukraine’s control over the
border entails control not only over
weapons but also over the movement of
persons and goods. This view was espe-
cially prevalent among respondents from
areas close to the conflict zones (govern-
ment-controlled Donbas, NGCAs, and
southern Russia). For them, it is impor-
tant that both the Russian–Ukrainian
border and the internal Ukrainian line
of contact be secure and favourable to
mobility on both sides.
Shared interests: Socio-economic survival
and mobility
The needs that underlie the restoration
of statehood and “border first” approach-
es are linked to security, socio-economic
survival, mobility, and access to a digni-
fied livelihood. A large number of NGCA
respondents also have a shared interest
in “positive” peace and a people-focused
solution to the problem of reintegration.
They expressed tolerance or even support
for the idea of reintegration on the con-
dition that their security and socio-econo-
mic needs are met.
The restoration of a “positive” Ukraini-
an state presence across the Donbas re-
gion can be identified as a second area
of common interest, shared by respon-
dents from different groups on both sides
of the border and the line of contact,
which may open up possibilities for com-
promise.
Cécile Druey, Anna Hess, Julia Kaplan, Valentina Cherevatenko
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Narrative II: Autonomy and “status first”
Respondents who subscribe to the second
narrative, which we have called “status
first”, view the granting of special status
(such as independence, autonomy, or fed-
eralization) to NGCAs and subsequent lo-
cal elections as a key priority that should
precede the restoration of border control
and prepare the ground for further steps
toward peace. Like the “border first” ap-
proach, this narrative does not entail a
unified position on the potential restora-
tion of Ukrainian statehood. While some
“status first” supporters insist on “inde-
pendence at any price” for the NGCAs,
others recommend the granting of special
status to Lugansk and Donetsk as a tem-
porary solution on the way to a more
comprehensive settlement. Here, too, the
moderate positions offer space for explor-
ing mutually acceptable solutions.
Position 4: “Independence or unification
with Russia”
“The word ‘Ukraine’ means ‘death
with braided hair’ [...]. I mean, these
whole negotiations are playing with
fire. Do whatever you want, tell me
on radio and television whatever you
want. With a friendly smile, strangle
your own people...” (Russian Federa-
tion, Donbas refugees)
As reflected in the quote above, support-
ers of the “independence at any price”
position perceive the potential reintegra-
tion and restoration of Kyiv’s control
over the border with Russia as an imme-
diate threat to their security. The state-
ments by some NGCA inhabitants and
most of the Donbas refugees in Russia
interviewed in the study reflect the pos-
ition that “war has created a point of
no return”. They subscribe to the view
that, as a result of the war and six years
of alienation, the only option for the
NGCAs is maximal independence from
the central authorities in Kyiv or incorpo-
ration into Russia, should independence
be hindered.
In other words, like the radical pos-
itions within the “border first” narrative,
the “independence at any price” position
revolves around the role played by Rus-
sia. The popular perception of Russia as a
guarantor of peace and a selfless protector
of the local population provides a basis
for seeing the potential unification of the
NGCAs with Russia as an attractive alter-
native to re-unification with Ukraine, es-
pecially if the latter entails “hard reinte-
gration”.
The “independence at any price”
stance comes from the parties’ immediate
need for physical safety and human secu-
rity in a broader sense. The permeabili-
ty of the border with Russia has proved
vital for NGCA inhabitants during the
intensive fighting and the subsequent iso-
lation from Ukraine. Without a solution
to their political status, and without guar-
antees from Kyiv regarding the safety of
Donbas, these respondents are afraid of
being pinned between a closed border
with Russia and a regime of restricted
access at the line of contact.
The call for full independence is mo-
tivated not only by considerations of
hard security but also by psychosocial
The Minsk Process: Societal Perceptions and Narratives
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considerations. In particular, NGCA in-
habitants and Donbas refugees in Russia
fear “retribution” from Ukraine should
they reintegrate. This fear has been exac-
erbated by the psychosocial consequences
of the armed conflict and six years of
alienation between the NGCAs and the
GCAs. Heavily traumatized by their im-
mediate experience of war and exposure
to death, destruction, and displacement,
Donbas refugees in Russia in particular
fear that if Ukraine regains full control
over the territory of the NGCAs, the con-
flict will resume. Many inhabitants of
the NGCAs fear that reintegration will re-
sult in their being treated as “second-class
citizens” by the GCAs due to perceived
cultural and linguistic differences that
are also reflected in socio-political orien-
tation (e.g. “pro-Maidan” vs “anti-Maid-
an”, pro-Western vs pro-Russian).
The need for full independence and
separation from the Ukrainian state also
seems to be justified by the adherents to
this position on socio-economic grounds.
The limited mobility of goods and per-
sons, lack of access to economic oppor-
tunities across the line of contact, and
the embargo against the NGCAs all give
rise to unfavourable prospects for local
development and cooperation in the fu-
ture. This perception has fed the belief
that independence or unification with
Russia are the only viable options. Here
again, these fears are directly related to
the need for security and access to a dig-
nified livelihood.
As in the case of “hard reintegration”,
one of the reasons behind this hard-line
“independence or unification with Rus-
sia” stance seems to be lack of transparen-
cy and information about the Minsk Pro-
cess and its provisions. A transparent
and solid communication strategy would
serve all parties concerned.15
Position 5: “Transitional autonomy and
soft independence”
“If there is a peaceful life there and
five to ten years pass, the very issue
of special status will disappear over
time.” (central Ukraine)
At the other end of the spectrum with-
in the “status first” narrative are support-
ers of “transitional autonomy”, who also
view granting NGCAs autonomous status
as an important first step on the way to
peace. In contrast to those who adhere
to the previous “full independence or
unification of Russia” stance, however,
they look at the issue from the perspec-
tive of Ukraine’s national interest. The
respondents who belong to this group are
moderate insofar as they accept that the
experience of war and six years of alien-
ation between the GCAs and the NGCAs
have created a new reality that must be
taken into account in the peace process.
Rather than viewing autonomous status
as an ultimate solution, however, they
understand it as a temporary compromise
that will ensure that Ukraine “does not
lose the Donbas”. This transitional auton-
omy, combined with the restoration of
Ukrainian statehood in the NGCAs, is
perceived by these respondents as one of
the most promising means of restoring
peace.
Cécile Druey, Anna Hess, Julia Kaplan, Valentina Cherevatenko
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Shared interests: a positive presence
of the Ukrainian state serving popular
needs
As a preliminary conclusion, it is clear
that several of the abovementioned pos-
itions offer space for shared interests. The
“soft independence” position (Position 5)
is reflected in the account of respondents
from all areas of Ukraine. Like the “soft
reintegration” approach, it is also a mod-
erate position aimed at a settlement of
the conflict through a positive presence
of the Ukrainian state, with the ultimate
interest of serving popular needs and pre-
serving national interests, and counter-
acting an increased Russification of the
Donbas.
Although this position of “transitional
autonomy and soft independence” was
most prominently reflected in the state-
ments by respondents in the GCAs, it
seems to be compatible with the interests
of the NGCA population. A large part
of the NGCA respondents were not cate-
gorically against their territory remaining
(or becoming again) part of Ukraine, but
were primarily opposed to a "hard reinte-
gration" for fear of Ukrainian retaliation.
Synthesis of converging interests and
related recommendations
Our brief analysis of the two key narra-
tives on the issue of the restoration of
Ukrainian statehood has uncovered con-
verging interests that open a space for
potential dialogue. Behind most of the
positions are interests related to survival,
security, socio-economic well-being, and
access to a dignified livelihood. In the
following, we offer recommendations to
relevant target groups with respect to the
identified areas of shared concern. Elab-
orating more concrete measures to this
effect is beyond the scope of this contri-
bution, however, and must be further ex-
plored by all actors who remain commit-
ted to a peaceful settlement of the con-
flict in eastern Ukraine.
Security and survival
Respondents from all groups mentioned
security and the absence of armed vi-
olence as basic conditions for their ex-
istence, the survival of the state, and
the restoration of peace in general. The
hard-line and emotionally charged “hard
reintegration” and “independence at any
price” positions seem to be rooted in a
deep feeling of insecurity and existential
threat. Negotiation and decisions on the
restoration of statehood in the NGCAs
must take these insecurities and fears
into account if an agreement on the
restoration of Ukrainian statehood in the
NGCAs is to be possible and its imple-
mentation feasible.
Recommendations
to the Ukrainian government
→ Develop measures to ease the reinte-
gration of NGCA inhabitants and re-
turning Donbas refugees, e.g. by of-
fering guarantees that NGCA inhabi-
1)
a)
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tants in Ukraine will not be discrimi-
nated against.
to the Russian government and NGCA
de facto authorities
→ Contribute to demilitarization and
demining in the NGCAs.
Restoration of statehood and a
“positive” Ukrainian state presence
Another area of shared interest reflect-
ed mainly in the moderate positions out-
lined above is the restoration of a “pos-
itive” Ukrainian state presence in the
Donbas area as a whole, based on re-
spect for the rights of – and meeting the
needs of – local inhabitants of both the
NGCAs and the GCAs. Notably, respon-
dents from the border zones in the GCAs,
the NGCAs, and Russia mentioned the
need to find pragmatic solutions to prob-
lems related to socio-economic develop-
ment, the reconstruction of infrastruc-
ture, and trans-border mobility. Many
respondents from the NGCAs (in both
the Luhansk and the Donetsk regions)
showed openness to the idea of “soft
re-integration” based on autonomous sta-
tus combined with a positive Ukrainian
state presence. Several respondents from
different groups stated that a moder-
ate “soft integration” position combined
with the recognition of transitional au-
tonomy or “soft independence” was an





to the Ukrainian government
→ Develop a comprehensive and coher-
ent strategy for state-building and lo-
cal development in the NGCAs in or-
der to win the confidence and support
of the local population and facilitate
reintegration.
→ Develop an easy, secure and trans-
parent regime of transfer between
NGCAs and GCAs at line of contact
checkpoints.
to the OSCE, the Ukrainian
government and civil society
organizations
→ Develop cooperation mechanisms be-
tween the OSCE and the Ministry for
the Reintegration of the Temporarily
Occupied Territories of Ukraine, on
the one hand, and civil society organi-
zations with expertise in transitional
justice, dialogue initiatives and local
development in NGCAs, on the other.
to the Russian government and NGCA
de facto authorities
→ Support the mobility of Ukrainian
citizens between NGCAs and GCAs
by contributing to a simple, secure,
and transparent regime of transfer
between NGCAs and GCAs at the
line of contact, notably through the
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checkpoints and the opening of addi-
tional ones in the Luhansk region (at
Schaste and Zolotoe).
Transparency and communication
Several respondents from the GCAs, the
NGCAs, the Donbas refugee population,
and Russia indicated that the little infor-
mation they have on the content and pro-
cedures of the Minsk Process comes from
informal channels.
Recommendations
to the OSCE and the Ukrainian and
Russian governments
→ Develop mechanisms of systematic
and regular communication for trans-
mitting and discussing information
about the Minsk Process and its com-
ponents, the progress of the negotia-
tions, and the continuous work of the
TCG with the larger public, including
Ukrainian, Russian, and international
audiences.
to the Ukrainian government
→ Communicate openly and transpar-
ently about the transitional nature of
the special status and autonomy of
the NGCAs, as foreseen in the Minsk
Process. This would contribute to re-
ducing tensions and polarization at




porary steps being a more realistic ap-
proach than “one big solution”.
to the Russian Government and NGCA
de facto authorities
→ Promote the establishment of an
open communicative space in the
NGCAs for Ukrainian and interna-
tional media (including the availabil-
ity of Ukrainian and international
broadcasting in digital, analogue, and
cable formats).
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